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The Young Turk Revolution and Austria-Hungary1
ROMAN KODET
The crisis caused by the Austro-Hungarian project of the Sanjak railway 
faded away during spring 1908. Austria-Hungary therefore tried again to 
activate its policy in Istanbul and to improve its reputation in the East. It 
could use the fact that a lot of opened problems remained there, which the 
Great Powers tried to solve. The complicated Macedonian question was 
still unsolved so the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary Alois Lexa von 
Aehrenthal could entertain his old scheme of the cooperation with Russia. 
Therefore he tried to press the Turks to undertake conservative reforms in 
Macedonia. This effort aimed to counter British radical reform proposals 
supported by Petersburg, which in the same time strived to push through 
their own railroad project of Transversal railway, which in their eyes 
should create a counterweight the Sanjak railway.2 Vienna could also use 
the fact that the Russo-British cooperation was weakened by the fact that 
both countries were not able to find an agreement in the case of judicial 
reform in Macedonia.3 It even seemed for a short time that Russia could 
return to the entente with Austria-Hungary badly shattered by the Sanjak 
crisis.4 However, in June 1908 the Tsar Nicholas II met Edward VII in 
Reval (todays Tallinn) and both countries were able to unify their stance to 
the Eastern question.5 Aehrenthal’s hopes that the Russo-British coopera-
tion would be weakened by their differences were not fulfilled. Further 
development in the policy of the Great Powers in Macedonia came never-
theless to a standstill after the break out of the Young Turk revolution. 
The political situation in Istanbul was quite calm during summer 
1908. One of the most important events in this period was the death of 
1 This article was created with the support of the Motivation System of the University of 
West Bohemia in Pilsen, part POSTDOC.
2 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 9. 3. 1908, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (henceforth HHStA),
Politisches Archiv (henceforth PA), XII Türkei, Kt. 346, Liasse XXXXVI–1, Balkanbah-
nen III–XII.
3 B. MOLDEN, Graf Aehrenthal, Stuttgart, Berlin 1917, p. 37.
4 These hopes were aroused by a sensational speech of Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky 
in front of the Duma on the 17th April 1908. The Minister said that he didn’t agree with 
the British proposals in Macedonia and announced that he was not opposed to the entente 
with Austria-Hungary. HHStA, Nachlass Berchtold (henceforth NL/Be), Kt. 1, Ty-
poskript Memoiren Berchtolds, Bd. I., p. 126.
5 Kiderlen to Bülow 18. 6. 1908, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–
1914 (henceforth GP), J. LEPSIUS, A. MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, F. THIMME 
(Hrsg.), Bd. 25, Berlin 1927, p. 468.
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British ambassador sir Nicholas O’Connora on the 19th March 1908.6 Alt-
hough Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the Port Margrave Johann Pal-
lavicini disagreed with British policy and was in an opposition to 
O’Connor especially in the question of Macedonian reforms, the death of 
O’Connor shattered him greatly. In his report to Vienna he wrote that de-
spite different opinions he had had the best relationship with O’Connor of 
all his colleagues in Istanbul.7 Pallavicini wasn’t able to create such a rela-
tionship with O’Connors successor sir Gerard August Lowther. The 
change on the post of the British ambassador in Istanbul collided by 
chance with the important transformation in the Ottoman diplomatic corps, 
during which were replaced the ambassadors in London and Rome.8 Ex-
cept of these events the situation in Istanbul was still, but this state was 
only an illusion.
The opposition against the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II mani-
fested not only by the national unrests in Armenia or Macedonia, but was 
evident even among the Turks. Those, who took part in the establishment, 
started even to criticize the current state of affairs. According to them, the 
main problem did not lay in the foreign, economic, national or religious 
policy, but in the manner of the rule of the empire, which was deeply in-
fluenced by the personality of the sovereign. The historians emphasize 
especially Abdülhamids secretive and paranoid character:9 “His fear 
reached grotesque dimensions. Specialized eunuchs had to taste not only 
Sultans food but also cigarettes to make sure they were not poisoned. It 
was forbidden to play Hamlet in the theaters, because it depicted a murder 
of the sovereign. The Sultan also allegedly suspected any novelties – for 
example he didn’t allow to use electric energy for private reasons, be-
cause electricity was produced by the dynamo which reminded him dyna-
mite. The use of telephone was also forbidden. A huge spying apparatus 
was built and the Sultan studied its reports carefully. Exiles, murder by 
strangling or drowning in the Bosporus were common methods of elimina-
tion of the opponents in Constantinople…  The words such as constitution, 
parliament revolution or unrest were forbidden to be used in the press.”10
Although it is undisputable that during Abdülhamids reign the Ottoman 
Empire went through the impressive development and modernization, his 
rule was more similar to despotism than to the political system of the 
6 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 19. 3. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 194, Berichte.
7 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 26. 3. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 194, Berichte.
8 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 1. 4. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 194, Berichte.
9 The roots of these character attributes influencing Sultans policy can be traced to the 
80s of the 19th century. See J. HASLIP, Der Sultan. Das Leben Abd ul-Hamids II., Mün-
chen 1968, pp. 143ff.
10 E. GOMBÁR, 0RGHUQtGČMLQ\,VOiPVNêFK]HPt, Praha 1999, pp. 274ff.
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European states, although Abdülhamid himself “came to the throne 
promising to support constitutionalism”.11 The absolutistic form of gov-
ernment and the sovereigns distrust to his surroundings were strengthened 
not only by his own experiences from the time of his accession to the 
throne,12 but also by current events – assassination attempts against politi-
cians and even the heads of states in Europe and America.13 During his 
reign he challenged several conspiracies, which only increased his para-
noia.14
If the functioning of the state and its institutions during the Ha-
midian era is analyzed, it must be observed that despite its modernization 
efforts it was a backward step when it is compared with the Tanzimat era, 
which preceded it. While during Tanzimat the loyalty of the civil service 
and the armed forces belong at least nominally to the state, Abdülhamid II 
observed a policy of promoting only those people to the high state posts
who were personally dependent on him. “The Sultan viewed loyalty as an 
indispensable qualification for employment in the civil service”, the repre-
sentatives of bureaucracy and army were therefore personally responsible 
to the ruler without being controlled by other institution.15 The center of 
power laid in the palace, where the Privy Council and other institutions 
controlled by the Sultan administered the affairs of the state.16 Those sus-
pected of liberal thoughts were controlled by secret police and thus with 
dubious loyalty were relieved from their posts, forced to go to exile or 
HYHQ H[HFXWHG $V DQ H[HPSODU\ FDVH VHUYHG WKH IDWH RI0LGKDW 3DúD –
creator of the first Ottoman constitution – who after his return from exile 
at the end of 1878 hold the office of the governor of Syria, but in 1881 
was imprisoned and died three years later in Yemen.17 Since the end of the 
11 S. J. SHAW, E. K. SHAW, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol. 
II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975, London, 
New York, Melbourne 1977, p. 211.
12 Ibidem, p. 212.
13 C. V. FINDLEY, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity. A History, 1789–2007,
New Haven, London 2010, p. 147.
14 For example in January 1908 the traditional ceremonies of kissing the Sultans hand 
were moved from the traditional place in palace Dolmabahçe to YÕOGÕ] because there 
were rumours of possible plot against the sovereign, who felt much safer in his own resi-
dence than in the huge building of Dolmabahçe, which reminded him the unhappy desti-
ny of his uncle – Sultan Abdülaziz. Pallavicini to Aehrenthal 15. 1. 1908, HHStA, PA, 
XII Türkei, Kt. 194, Berichte.
15 0ù +$1ø2ö/8A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton, Oxford 
2008, p. 125.
16 SHAW, SHAW, pp. 213ff.
17 Ibidem, p. 216.
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80s of the 19th century the Sultan relied increasingly on a narrow circle of 
the men whom he appointed to important state offices.18
An opposition started to form in the 90s of the 19th century against 
this form of government. The leaders of the Ottoman emigration in Paris 
founded a Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemijeti) 
with Ahmed Riza in its lead. The domestic illegal organization Ottoman 
Freedom Society whose members were young officers of the Ottoman 
army in Thessalonica came into connection with the formation known as 
the Young Turks (Les Jeunes Turcs) in France.19 Given the fact that a lot 
of these men were members of Freemasonry lodges, their influence in the 
units of the Ottoman army stationed in Macedonia started to spread with 
considerable speed.20 There was the growing chaos in Macedonia, which 
the Great Powers were not able to solve; these young soldiers who were 
afraid of the collapse of the Ottoman rule in Europe called for an install-
ment of such a regime which would be able to bring order.
The situation in Macedonia was quite tense during the spring of 
1908. Two important factors contributed to the final escalation. A rumor 
spread at the beginning of summer 1908 that the Sultan who watched the 
situation in Thessalonica carefully was preparing a purge in the army to 
get it rid of the unreliable elements.21 The news about the meeting of the 
Tsar with Edward VII in Reval also gave the Young Turks an impression 
that both sovereigns could make a secret pact which would solve the Mace-
donian question in a way that would mean the end of the Ottoman rule in 
Europe. This speculation created an atmosphere of uneasiness among the 
Young Turks.22 The Young Turks also conspicuously followed the policy 
of Vienna, which tried to renovate its entente with Russia and to pressure 
on the Porte in the case of the Macedonian reforms.23 These all facts 
prompted the Young Turks to take decisive action.
18 Ibidem, pp. 218ff.
19 +$1ø2ö/8Sp. 145ff., compare with GOMBÁR, pp. 291ff.
20 M. MAZOWER, Salonica, City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950,
New York 2006, pp. 255ff.
21 +$1ø2ö/8S
22 Ibidem, pp. 148ff.
23 One of the most interesting episodes of the negotiation between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia in June and July 1908 was a memorandum of the Russian Foreign Minister 
Izvolsky from the 2nd July in which he outlined his idea of further development of the 
Macedonian question and the whole situation on the Balkans. Izvolsky mentioned here 
that he was prepared to observe positive policy towards the Austro-Hungarian interests 
on the Balkans if Vienna supported Russian interests in the Straits. Memorandum of the 
Russian Foreign Minister 2. 7. 1908, Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosni-
schen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des ös-
terreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Äussern (henceforth ÖUA), Ausge-
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On the 3rd July 1908 Major Ahmed Niyazi Bey deserted with his 
troops and started an armed struggle against the government in Istanbul. 
His main demand was the renewal of the constitution of 1876. Sultans 
effort to suppress the insurrection which gained widespread support in the 
army failed after the murder of one of his aide-de-FDPSV ùHPVL 3DúD
tasked by the crushing of the rebels by the Young Turk officers in Mo-
nastir.24 In the second half of July 1908 the insurgents gained enough 
power and support to start planning a march against Istanbul itself. Alt-
hough the Sultan tried to prevent such development by igniting a conflict 
with the Bulgars,25 the fall of his regime was inevitable. In an effort to 
save as much as possible from his position, the Sultan decided to take the 
situation into his own hands and on 23rd July issued an irradé restoring the 
constitution. One day later he announced an amnesty for the political pris-
oners and dissolved his feared secret police.26 The power of the palace was 
therefore broken in considerably short period and the power in the state 
was taken over by the representatives of the Young Turks who were al-
most unknown by the representatives of the Great Powers.27
The reaction of the Great Powers on the situation in Macedonia 
was at first quite mild. The British representatives in Istanbul were even 
refused to negotiate with the Young Turk envoys who tried to gain British 
support at the beginning of July 1908.28 Even the strongest power in Is-
tanbul – Germany – underestimated the situation in Macedonia. Its ambas-
sador Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein was at a vacation and was tempo-
rarily stood in by Kiderlen-Wächter, who described the Young Turks as 
people who on the basis of their superficial knowledge of the European 
institutions wanted to reform the empire on the basis of parlamentarism. 
He underestimated their capabilities when he claimed that the movement 
was not very numerous and he therefore didn’t consider it as dangerous.29
Vienna was also disquieted by the situation. Aehrenthal was especially 
surprised by the lack of action on the part of the Sultan. According to Pal-
lavicini’s reports there was an atmosphere of confusion and helplessness 
LQ WKH <ÕOGÕ] SDODFH ZKLFK HVFDODWHG ZLWK WKH VSUHDGLQJ RI WKH <RXQJ
wählt von L. BITTNER, A. F. PRIBRAM, H. SRBIK et. al., Bd. 1, Wien, Leipzig 1930, 
pp. 9–11.
24 SHAW, SHAW, pp. 266ff.
25 +$1ø2ö/8S
26 GOMBÁR, p. 295, compare with SHAW, SHAW, p. 267.
27 F. R. BRIDGE, Die jungtürkische Revolution aus österreichisch-ungarischer Sicht, in: 
Österreichische Osthefte 38, Hf. 1, Wien 1996, p. 26.
28 S. McMEEKIN, The Berlin-Baghdad Express. The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s 
Bid for World Power 1898–1918, London, New York, Toronto 2011, p. 69.
29 Kiderlen to the German Foreign office, 10. 7. 1908, GP, Bd. 25, p. 557.
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Turk movement.30 Vienna was however only able to watch the situation 
and wait further developments. After the collapse of the Hamidian regime 
Pallavicini could only claim that “Europe stands in front of totally new 
situation”, and that he couldn’t estimate the consequences of the latest 
events. According to him the Sultans regime was much weaker than it 
seemed and in his situation Abdülhamid had no choice except of the ac-
cepting the Young Turk demands.31 The Germans assessed the situation 
similarly and too late realized how much was their strong position in Is-
tanbul dependent on the person of the Sultan.32 Kiderlen-Wächter could 
only observe how the center of power was transferred from the sovereign 
to the Grand Vizier and with some anxiety added that the Young Turk 
movement wouldn’t be satisfied with the restoration of the constitution.33
Aehrenthal viewed the Young Turk revolution and the renewal of
the constitution as potentially dangerous development, which could ac-
cording to him endanger Austro-Hungarian interests in the sphere of the 
Eastern question. The Austro-Hungarian minister had in mind especially 
the unresolved question of Bosnia and Herzegovina.34 The situation of 
both occupied provinces which were nominally under the Ottoman rule 
was so precarious that it required resolute action to clarify their position. 
There was a menace that if the new Young Turk government proclaimed 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the position of Austria-Hungary in 
the provinces could collapse. Aehrenthal was also concerned by the fact 
that the unrest in the European part of Turkey could provoke Serbia and 
Bulgaria to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, which would considera-
bly complicate the Balkan policy. He therefore proposed the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of August 1908. In such case he 
planned to simultaneously withdraw Austro-Hungarian garrisons from the 
Sanjak of Novi Pazar.35 However, a step of such importance couldn’t be 
made without proper diplomatic preparations.
Aehrenthal spoke about the current situation in Istanbul with coun-
cilor of the German embassy in Vienna Count Brockdorff-Rantzau. Dur-
ing their talks Aehrenthal advocated a principle of nonintervention into the 
inner policy of the Ottoman Empire and demonstrated his preparedness to 
30 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, 8. and 14. 7. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 195, Berich-
te.
31 Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, 24. 7. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 195, Berichte.
32 McMEEKIN, p. 69.
33 Kiderlen to Bülow, 27. 7. 1908, GP, Bd. 25, p. 572.
34 A copy of Aehrenthals letter to Pallavicini, 4. 8. 1908, HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 
195, Berichte.
35 Aehrenthal to Beck, 7. 8. 1908, ÖUA, Bd. 1, pp. 23–25.
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cooperate not only with Germany but also with Russia.36 Although the 
Germans verbally agreed with this concept, their policy in Istanbul con-
centrated on maintain their own interests.37 Aehrenthals effort to establish 
a cooperation of three “conservative” powers therefore failed. After Aeh-
renthal realized the menace to the Austro-Hungarian position in the occu-
pied provinces he decided to concentrate primarily on this question. The 
main obstacle to the proposed annexation could be resistance of Russia, 
which Aehrenthal had to gain on his side by negotiations with Russian 
Foreign minister Izvolsky. He planned to use the ongoing negotiations 
with Petersburg about the situation in Macedonia.38 As a base of these 
talks Aehrenthal wanted to use indirect Izvolskys offers from 2nd July 
1908 in which the Russian minister hinted that Russia could accept the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Austro-Hungarian 
support of the Russian aspirations in the Straits.39
Izvolsky came with similar proposal already at the end of the year 
1907 and came with it at the beginning of summer 1908, because the result 
of the Reval meeting filled him with optimism with regard to the stance of 
London. The deal with Austria-Hungary should, according to him, open a 
path to historical success for which he was ready to sacrifice some of the 
Russian interests on the Balkans.40 Although Aehrenthal declined these 
probes with the explanation that the “question of the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is only matter of Austria-Hungary”,41 the Young Turk 
revolution changed his opinion, because in Aehrenthal’s eyes the changed 
condition made the annexation absolutely necessary. Izvolskys hints were 
therefore a base for further negotiations. At the beginning of August 1908 
Aehrenthal was prepared to use this opportunity to clarify the position of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. An occasion to directly negotiate with Izvolsky 
came at the end of summer when the Russian minister planned to visit 
Carlsbad. Aehrenthal therefore instructed Austro-Hungarian ambassador 
in Petersburg Count Leopold Berchtold to invite Izvolsky to his castle 
Buchlau where both ministers would be able to discuss the situation in 
36 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the German Foreign office, 27. 7. 1908, GP, Bd. 25, p. 574.
37 After the initial surprise Berlin tried to maintain cautious policy. They accepted the 
new regime and even announced that they consider this change as necessary. Schoens
memorandum, 29. 7. 1908, GP, Bd. 25, pp. 580–581.
38 Nearer see Aehrenthal to Berchtold, 24. 7. 1908, ÖUA, Bd. 1, pp. 15ff.
39 Memorandum of the Russian Foreign Minister, 2. 7. 1908, ÖUA, Bd. 1, pp. 9–11.
40 W. M. CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der Bosnischen Annexionskrise,
Uppsala 1955, p. 314.
41 $6.ě,9$1&tVDĜVNiSROLWLND5DNRXVNR-8KHUVNRD1ČPHFNRYHYURSVNpSROLWLFHY
letech 1906–1914, Praha 1996, p. 48.
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private.42 It seemed therefore that the Young Turk revolution brought 
Austria-Hungary an opportunity to renew entente with Russia and to push 
through its interests on the Balkans. However, the reality should have been 
different than Aehrenthal planned.
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0RUDYLDQ3Uo-
vincial Archives), Fond G 138 (Family archive of Berchtolds), Kt. 133.
